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Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

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Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. Two years ago, the General Assembly and the Security Council came together to express their commitment to building and sustaining peace. They emphasized, in the twin resolutions on the review of the peacebuilding architecture, General Assembly resolution 70/262 and Security Council resolution 2282 (2016), that Member States needed to work better together to sustain peace at all stages of conflict and in all its dimensions and stressed that sustaining peace was imperative to preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict. It was recognized in the resolutions that sustaining peace should be broadly understood as a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population were taken into account.

2. In the resolutions, the General Assembly and the Security Council recognized that sustaining peace was a shared task and responsibility of Government and all other national stakeholders and should flow through all three pillars of the United Nations' engagement at all stages of conflict. They further reaffirmed the primary responsibility of national Governments and authorities in identifying, driving and directing priorities, strategies and activities for sustaining peace and emphasized that inclusivity was key to advancing national peacebuilding processes and objectives.

3. An important breakthrough in the twin resolutions was the recognition that efforts to sustain peace were necessary not only once conflict had broken out but also long beforehand, through the prevention of conflict and addressing its root causes. More countries have recently experienced violent conflict than at any time in nearly three decades. Forced displacement has reached unparalleled levels. In too many places, the cohesion of societies and the well-being of people are at risk. Building a common vision of society must involve paying attention to the causes of those problems. In the resolutions, it was recognized that the international community must redouble its efforts to support Member States in preventing crises that exact such unacceptable and growing human and financial tolls. Another important element of the resolutions was the recognition of the importance of women's leadership and

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participation in conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding and the need to increase the representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict. The consideration of gender-related issues in all discussions pertinent to sustaining peace should remain at the front of the efforts of the United Nations and the international community.

4. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 30 of the resolutions on the review of the peacebuilding architecture. It provides an update on the progress made in the implementation of the resolutions and contains specific recommendations to address existing gaps. My aim is to forge a common vision and common systems and capacities across the United Nations to consistently and adequately support Member States in their endeavour to sustain peace and build resilient and prosperous nations in line with their commitments to leave no one behind.

5. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development contains the blueprint of the common vision of society towards which the world is trying to move. Inclusive and sustainable development not only is an end in itself but also happens to be the best defence against the risks of violent conflict. The 2030 Agenda also contains the promise to leave no one behind in the quest to build such societies. In the twin resolutions, it was recognized that development was a central goal in itself, and the important contributions of the United Nations development system to peacebuilding, in particular through economic development and poverty eradication, were acknowledged. The United Nations system needs to continue to strengthen cooperation and coordination for that purpose in the field through United Nations country teams and at United Nations Headquarters, in accordance with their respective mandates, with respect for national ownership and the priorities of countries affected by conflict, including through the overarching framework of the United Nations operational activities for development.

6. The scale and nature of the challenge of sustaining peace calls for closer strategic and operational partnerships among the United Nations, national Governments and other key stakeholders, including international, regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions, civil society organizations, women's groups, youth organizations and the private sector, taking into account national priorities and policies. In today's complex world, those partnerships need to harness the energies of all sectors of society. The United Nations is one partner among others, and all partners need to come together in support of the efforts of Governments.

7. I am convinced that the fragmentation of efforts across the United Nations system undermines its ability to support Member States in their efforts to build and sustain peaceful societies and to respond early and effectively to conflicts and crises. I have therefore introduced a set of mutually reinforcing reforms to ensure that the United Nations is more fit for purpose, including in the realms of development, management and peace and security. The reforms aim to ensure greater coherence and accountability within those pillars and generate greater coherence and synergies across the United Nations system.

II. Operational and policy coherence to strengthen support to peacebuilding and sustaining peace

8. In the resolutions, there was a call in strong terms for more coherence in international support to Member States in their efforts to build and sustain peace. Decades of experience and a number of independent studies, including the report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (see

A/69/968-S/2015/490), have pointed to scattershot, incoherent and occasionally contradictory or competitive international efforts as a significant source of failed peacebuilding efforts. Given the resurgence of conflict and the vast scale of crisis and suffering around the globe, greater operational and policy coherence among international actors and across the United Nations system is critical to strengthening support to Member States.

9. The most crucial sources of support are usually other Member States, often those in the same region or with strong historical ties, that can provide the political and financial support necessary to the process of building a peaceful society. The essential idea behind the creation of the peacebuilding architecture in 2005 was to institutionalize the process and establish a standing mechanism to rally Member States around specific peacebuilding challenges. The Peacebuilding Commission, which has a unique role to play in advancing intergovernmental coherence through its cross-pillar mandate, has already diversified its working methods to enhance its flexibility as a dedicated intergovernmental platform. Recent good practices of the Commission include attention to cross-border and regional issues in the Great Lakes region and the Sahel, support to the transition from a peace operation in Liberia and the adoption of a gender strategy that is the first of its kind for an intergovernmental body of the United Nations. Member States have also used the platform of the Commission for constructive discussions on Burkina Faso, Colombia, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Somalia and Sri Lanka, at the initiative of the countries concerned. I welcome such flexibility and innovation and encourage further efforts to enhance the role of the Commission.

10. Regional and other more flexible frameworks for coherent intergovernmental support to sustaining peace have also shown great promise, in particular when they involve the necessary resolve and a common vision among the countries concerned. The engagement of the countries of the Sahel region, including through the framework of the Group of Five for the Sahel, to address the complex and multidimensional challenges facing them is a good example of Member States' leadership in that regard. It also highlights the need for a system-wide approach from the United Nations and for close collaboration with partners such as the African Union, the European Union, the World Bank, the Alliance for the Sahel, Member States and the countries concerned to ensure a coordinated, coherent, integrated and results-oriented response.

11. I welcome other efforts by Member States to enhance policy coherence in support of sustaining peace. In January 2017, the President of the General Assembly convened a high-level dialogue on sustainable development and sustaining peace, in which I participated and which brought together the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Security Council, the President of the Economic and Social Council and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission for the first time to promote coordination and coherence across peace and development efforts. The Human Rights Council also considered the links between peacebuilding and human rights at its thirty-fourth session. Such initiatives have built upon the regular exchanges held by the Peacebuilding Commission with the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council.

12. Coherence and complementarity among the principal organs of the United Nations, including the governing bodies of United Nations entities, are critical. The role of the Economic and Social Council in the oversight of operational activities for development, development cooperation and humanitarian assistance and its overall coordination of the United Nations development system complement the valuable work of the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission. I welcome the strong resolve shown by Member States in that regard and encourage them to explore

further opportunities to enhance links at the intergovernmental level in support of sustaining peace in the field.

13. When the United Nations works together across the three pillars and with all relevant partners, a meaningful difference can be made in peoples' lives. Coherence in operational engagement is key in that respect. In the Gambia, the value could be seen of swift and sustained regional engagement in support of national conflict prevention efforts through the Economic Community of West African States, supported by the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission and backed up by a coordinated and coherent United Nations system. Immediately after the peaceful resolution of the post-electoral crisis in the Gambia, a United Nations assessment mission, a visit by the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and the quick disbursement of grants and provision of capacities from the Peacebuilding Fund, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Department of Political Affairs and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights were critical in ensuring support to the new Government's work to sustain peace. The identification of peacebuilding priorities and the design of United Nations country-level support have been nationally driven and focused on ensuring ownership and sustainability.

14. Similarly, in Liberia, work is under way to ensure that United Nations support is sustained and coherent in a transition context. The Peacebuilding Commission has provided advice to the Security Council on the transition of the peace operation mandate and the development of a national peacebuilding plan, led by national stakeholders and supported by the recovery and peacebuilding assessment, a tripartite framework of the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union. In follow-up, the Peacebuilding Commission provided a platform for United Nations leadership in Liberia to discuss with Member States a capacity mapping exercise to identify expected financing and expertise gaps following the departure of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). A multi-partner trust fund has been established and is supported by the Peacebuilding Fund in its catalytic role.

15. The opportunities for meaningful impact on the ground when the United Nations system joins up its efforts are especially evident where peace operations are deployed. Peace operations, both special political and peacekeeping missions, can be powerful platforms for preventing conflict from escalating and for sustaining peace, as acknowledged and welcomed in the resolutions. Together with development, humanitarian and human rights actors, United Nations peace operations carry out regular strategic assessments to develop a shared understanding and to propose options for the best way to support Member States in sustaining peace. In order to maximize the coherence and, therefore, the impact of that support, such assessments should have stronger links to integrated strategic frameworks and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which would enable mission components and members of United Nations country teams to work from the same analysis and towards the same goals, in support of national priorities. A good example is the United Nations Peacebuilding and Development Assistance Framework in the Central African Republic, which supports the national recovery and peacebuilding plan for the period 2017–2021, aligns national priorities across peace and security, reconciliation, human rights and development and is supported by the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Commission. I reaffirm my commitment to integration as a way of maximizing the impact of the United Nations in mission settings. I have also requested that the integrated assessment and planning policy be revised to improve coherent action across the United Nations system in support of sustaining peace.

16. There are also useful examples of in-country cross-pillar cooperation in specific substantive areas. In 10 conflict-affected countries, the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis

Situations of UNDP and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations brings together different parts of the United Nations engaged in support to the rule of law for joint analysis, planning and programming. In Somalia, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and the United Nations country team implement a joint programme to support rule of law institutions of Somalia, bringing together nine United Nations partners around common strategic objectives. The model has also been useful in ensuring that cross-cutting issues are the priority of all United Nations entities. For example, through programmes supported by the Global Focal Point, there has been an increased focus on women's access to justice in core rule of law programmes, as well as greater implementation of the 15 per cent target for spending on advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women as a principal objective.

17. Working jointly requires a coherent division of expertise and the pooling of resources. The Joint Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention of UNDP and the Department of Political Affairs supports the deployment of peace and development advisers in more than 40 resident coordinator offices. Peace and development advisers provide in-country analytical and programmatic guidance, support the conflict sensitivity of United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks and United Nations country team programmes and strengthen national capacities for prevention. In Lesotho, for example, the peace and development adviser facilitated United Nations support to the country's national reform processes, including dialogue and consensus-building. The joint project of UNDP, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs on United Nations transitions in mission settings is another example of cross-pillar cooperation. The challenge now is to turn such examples into standard practice, so that Member States can benefit from joined-up United Nations support that has maximum impact. To that end, I will build upon such initiatives by encouraging the creation of additional cross-system models for United Nations joint technical support that pool capacities and funding, resulting in programming that helps to sustain peace.

18. My proposed restructuring of the peace and security pillar, as supported by the General Assembly in its resolution 72/199, will also contribute to greater coherence of United Nations efforts (see A/72/525). It is aimed at prioritizing conflict prevention and sustaining peace, enhancing the effectiveness and coherence of peacekeeping operations and special political missions, overcoming fragmentation by moving towards a single integrated peace and security pillar and aligning the peace and security pillar more closely with the development and human rights pillars so as to foster greater coherence and cross-pillar coordination. To that end, existing substantive capacities and resources in the area of peace and security will be reorganized and integrated more rationally, including through the creation of a single political-operational structure with regional responsibilities that will support a more holistic approach to peacebuilding and sustaining peace through the development of regional strategies and approaches, enhanced partnerships with regional organizations and more effective support to the Peacebuilding Commission.

19. As mandated by the resolutions on the review of the peacebuilding architecture, the Peacebuilding Support Office will be reinforced to assume a stronger cross-pillar bridging role to strengthen the pillar's orientation towards sustaining peace. Building upon its existing work in support of the development-humanitarian-peacebuilding continuum, the Office will function as a "hinge" between the peace and security pillar and the other pillars and with the humanitarian community. It will be responsible for connecting relevant tools and approaches across the conflict spectrum, drawing together the expertise of the United Nations system to facilitate coherent system-wide action, and for strengthening partnerships within and beyond the United Nations.

Together with the participation of the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support in key cross-pillar mechanisms, including the Executive Committee, the significant strengthening of the Peacebuilding Fund and enhanced support to the Peacebuilding Commission, those measures will contribute to the revitalization of the Office and help to fulfil the original vision behind its establishment, to foster strategic coherence in United Nations efforts in support of sustaining peace.

20. In order to realize that vision, I propose that the capacity of the Peacebuilding Support Office be strengthened within the existing resources of the peace and security pillar. In that respect, I ask Member States to consider favourably my detailed proposals for the restructuring of the peace and security pillar and to enhance the capacities of the Peacebuilding Support Office and other parts of the proposed Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including through the use of the peacekeeping support account for peacebuilding activities in relevant peacekeeping settings. I also encourage United Nations entities to continue to second personnel to the Office both to reinforce its capacity and to strengthen system-wide synergy and coherence.

21. The international human rights framework, in particular Member States' obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provides a critical foundation for sustaining peace. The collective work of the United Nations system to advance human rights should help to identify the root causes of and responses to conflict. In that respect, it will remain imperative for the peace and security and development pillars to make better use of the existing human rights mechanisms, such as special procedures, the treaty bodies and the universal periodic review, and their recommendations in support of Member States.

22. Central to those efforts is a more coherent United Nations that will think, plan and programme in a joined-up way, drawing upon its full range of tools to support Member States. This begins with a common understanding of the major risks and opportunities relevant to each Member State. A common analysis of those risks and opportunities in turn allows for risk-informed development strategies and targeted efforts to build resilience and sustain peace. No region or State will face the same mix of risks or the same level of exposure to those risks. The Sustainable Development Goals provide a blueprint for engaging with Member States on those issues. At the country level, there should be a common prioritization of risks and opportunities, grounded in universally agreed human rights and humanitarian norms and standards, as well as robust gender analysis. Peacebuilding strategies linked to programmes with corresponding joint steering committees, including Governments, the United Nations and civil society, have been helpful. I will ask senior United Nations leadership in the field to ensure joined-up analysis of risks and to translate such analysis into coherent strategies and actions in support of sustaining peace.

23. In the resolutions, the important contributions of the United Nations development system to peacebuilding were recognized and the need to continue strengthening cooperation and coordination for that purpose, respecting both national ownership and the priorities of countries affected by conflict, was stressed. Sustainable development is the primary goal and an end in itself. It also has the advantage of being the best guarantee of peace that endures. The primary objective of the United Nations development system is to support Member States in achieving the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, based on national ownership of the goals.

24. My proposed reforms of the development system foresee a new generation of United Nations country teams, centred around a strategic United Nations Development Assistance Framework and led by an impartial, independent and empowered resident coordinator, with a stronger focus on providing collective

support and generating common results. As outlined in my report on repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda (A/72/684-E/2018/7), the development system needs to be much more cohesive and integrated at the country level to expand the offer of whole-of-system expertise to countries. Resident coordinator offices, drawing upon the full range of expertise of resident and non-resident United Nations entities, should be equipped to serve as hubs for collective analysis and planning. Resident coordinator offices would therefore be responsible for coordinating development strategies that are risk informed and help to build peaceful and inclusive societies. Critical to this will be a revitalized United Nations Development Assistance Framework, as the single most important United Nations country planning instrument, informed by a conflict and development analysis endorsed by the United Nations Sustainable Development Group. The analysis will be continuously updated to incorporate guidance on conflict sensitivity and sustaining peace and should be used routinely in planning processes of the Frameworks, with the support of peace and development advisers, where present. Already, 80 per cent of the Frameworks launched in 2017 include contributions to sustaining peace. I will strive to ensure that the Frameworks are risk informed and become more effective tools for supporting national efforts to build resilience and for accelerating transitions out of crisis to sustain peace.

25. United Nations entities are adapting to this cross-pillar approach to sustaining peace within their respective mandates. Already, 77 per cent of resident coordinators report close collaboration among entities engaged in development, disaster risk reduction, humanitarian action and sustaining peace. Of the 19 entities, 16 include peacebuilding and sustaining peace in their strategic plans, guidance and training. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), for example, has included targets relating to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies in its Strategic Plan, 2018–2021. Supporting peacebuilding initiatives is a core priority of the strategic plan for the period 2017–2022 of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The World Food Programme has adopted a peacebuilding policy and guidance. Recognizing the primacy of existing mandates, the needs articulated by Member States and the overriding importance of development as the primary objective, I encourage all United Nations entities to view sustaining peace as an important goal to which their work can contribute and to integrate the approach to sustaining peace into their global and country-specific strategic plans, as appropriate.

26. The United Nations Sustainable Development Group is a key mechanism for United Nations coherence and, under the leadership of the Deputy Secretary-General, is on track to become even more effective. Working closely with the recently established joint steering committee to advance humanitarian and development collaboration, the Group will also place greater emphasis on fostering synergies in humanitarian and development action, as well as its links to peace, in support of the 2030 Agenda. In addition, United Nations support to countries for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals must be guided by the mainstreaming, acceleration and policy support strategy developed by the Group and must be risk informed and conflict sensitive. I will deploy multidisciplinary missions of the mainstreaming, acceleration and policy support strategy to help to ensure that support to national planning for the 2030 Agenda is conflict sensitive and integrated. I will also ensure that the new United Nations Sustainable Development Group, under the leadership of the Deputy Secretary-General, will continue to promote cross-pillar coordination and coherence in support of the 2030 Agenda and its links to peace, including through its results groups.

27. Without the full participation of women in society, neither peace nor prosperity can be ensured over the long term. The meaningful participation of women measurably strengthens protection efforts and deepens the effectiveness of

peacebuilding. Research also points to the direct relationship between gender equality, on the one hand, and resilience to and prevention of conflict, on the other. The women and peace and security agenda is therefore essential for all the work of the United Nations system in support of Member States. My Seven-Point Action Plan on Gender-Responsive Peacebuilding to accelerate progress on the participation of women in peacebuilding aims to increase financing for gender-responsive peacebuilding, expand the access of women to decision-making and improve gender-sensitive analysis and planning. I remain committed to ensuring the full implementation of the Seven-Point Action Plan and will request a review and update of all elements of the Plan in the light of the reforms that I have initiated, well in advance of the forthcoming twentieth anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), to ensure that the appropriate changes are made and that the United Nations system can demonstrate effectively the progress made in that area.

28. Young people represent the future of society and are also very much the present. While young people's experience of peace and conflict is varied, conflict can disrupt educational and employment opportunities, leading to trauma and mistrust towards the State and the international community. Most young people resist violence, and some actively engage in peacebuilding and sustaining peace despite the risks they face. Yet, young people remain underrepresented in decision-making at all levels. It is high time that the contribution of young people to sustaining peace was recognized and supported. The youth and peace and security agenda offers opportunities to galvanize coherent United Nations engagement in support of young people and their contribution to peacebuilding and sustaining peace. I look forward to the recommendations of the independent progress study on youth and peace and security requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2250 (2015) and to further advancing the agenda together with Member States.

III. Leadership, accountability and capacity in supporting peacebuilding and sustaining peace

29. I am determined to improve leadership, accountability and capacity across the United Nations system, both at Headquarters and in the field, so that the Organization can offer Member States the most effective possible support in sustaining peace. This will need to include efforts to ensure the continuity of relevant peacebuilding programmes, senior leadership and personnel through different phases of United Nations engagement, in order to improve transitions, and a strengthening of the capacity of the senior leadership of the United Nations country team to absorb relevant peacebuilding functions following the drawdown of Security Council-mandated missions.

30. The adoption in 2017 of a system-wide leadership framework underscores my commitment to improving leadership across the United Nations system. My system-wide strategy on gender parity is aimed at addressing the lack of parity at all levels, in particular in senior positions, and at improving organizational culture with respect to gender.

31. A major objective of the management reform proposals Member States have now endorsed is to decentralize decision-making, bringing it closer to the point of delivery and making the planning and budget process more accountable and responsive. I intend to empower heads of departments, offices, regional commissions and field missions to align authority in the management of financial, human and material resources with the delegated responsibility for mandate implementation. A clearer link between resources and results will serve to achieve greater transparency and accountability. The ability to manage resources effectively in response to urgent

requirements, emerging risks and current operational needs will enhance the Organization's effective and timely support in sustaining peace.

32. At the heart of my proposals for the repositioning of the United Nations development system is my conviction that a new generation of United Nations country teams is required for delivery on the 2030 Agenda, supported by empowered, impartial and competent resident coordinators. The proposals are also based upon the results of an independent review, conducted by the Overseas Development Institute, of the capacities of United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes to sustain peace. In its review, the Institute concluded that there was a need to strengthen capacities to conduct conflict or context analysis and to translate analysis into more conflict-sensitive programming. As integrators of policy concerning all of the Sustainable Development Goals, resident coordinators must be better prepared to work across the development-humanitarian-peacebuilding continuum. This includes a strong understanding of relevant United Nations normative frameworks and the ability to translate these into system-wide analysis, planning and programming. In conflict-affected settings, resident coordinators will need to ensure that United Nations country teams work in an integrated manner with United Nations peace operations to contribute fully to building resilience and sustaining peace. In relevant contexts, resident coordinators, including triple-hatted deputy special representatives of the Secretary-General, must receive integrated support from development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding entities in order to foster an integrated response that includes human rights and gender equality, and must be accountable for improving inter-agency collaboration to support national actors in risk management, resilience-building and the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies.

33. It is important that those in leadership positions in the field receive assistance from Headquarters, including guidance, training, surge capacities, peer-to-peer support and the delegated authority to take calculated risks in support of national priorities. Resident coordinators must have a diverse skillset, with strong leadership, team-building and communications skills, including in integrated planning, risk management, gender issues and human rights, in order to be able to promote coherence in a collaborative manner. It is also important for resident coordinators to have gained experience from working in United Nations system organizations and to be involved in continuing their professional education. I will encourage diversity of experience across peace and security, development, human rights and humanitarian issues for all United Nations senior leadership, with improved and adequately incentivized inter-agency mobility, including across all three pillars of the United Nations.

34. The need for collaborative leadership is particularly in evidence when a United Nations peace operation is being drawn down. I recommend that, during the drawdown, a mapping of capacity of the United Nations country team against peacebuilding priorities be undertaken and discussed with Member States through the Peacebuilding Commission. This is what occurred in Liberia, where the assessment of capacities against the priorities outlined in the Liberia peacebuilding plan, conducted by the joint project of UNDP, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs on United Nations transitions in mission settings, showed the need for substantial investments through the United Nations country team in order to continue peacebuilding efforts. Comprehensive gender analysis and effective planning are also essential to ensure that gains on gender equality are not eroded when peace operations are withdrawn. Another example of good practices in this regard is the integrated transition planning that took place in Côte d'Ivoire. Integrated planning at an early stage and throughout the life cycle of a mission is critical. Additional planning capacity should also be deployed where and when required.

35. Not all types of technical expertise are available within United Nations country teams or missions. Resident coordinators must be able to benefit from the expertise and assets of the entire United Nations system to ensure better delivery of their mandates. I will take steps to ensure that resident coordinators can draw more easily on advice from centres of expertise at Headquarters and at the regional level. In my report on repositioning the United Nations development system, I indicated that as part of the optimization of regional structures, the Organization would ensure that the development and review of United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks included a more thorough analysis of regional and transboundary issues, with the regional commissions as an integral part of the process. The regional commissions could also play a supporting role in integrated analysis at the regional level and provide a convening platform for intergovernmental dialogue. Over the medium term, United Nations regional assets should be restructured so as to streamline and maximize the impact of the United Nations regional presence in support of attaining the Sustainable Development Goals and, as part of that objective, sustaining peace.

36. In the report on the United Nations development system, I also included proposals to strengthen resident coordinator offices and ensure that capacities matched the needs of national priorities, building on the comparative advantages of the United Nations system. The United Nations system's efforts must continue to be oriented around three key principles: reinforcing national ownership; developing country-contextual responses; and ensuring the effective delivery of development results on the ground. In considering the specificity of each context, I recommend that staff of the resident coordinator offices or of the integrated presence in a country have advisory responsibilities, in addition to planning and coordination, monitoring and evaluation and financing support functions, in accordance with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework. I recommend that the Joint Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention, which currently deploys more than 40 peace and development advisers to resident coordinator offices, in full agreement with the respective Governments, serve as a model for making such enhanced capacities available.

37. Under my proposal for restructuring the peace and security pillar, the single regional structure will offer guidance and support to resident coordinators in non-mission settings, in close cooperation with the United Nations Sustainable Development Group. The proposed Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and of Peace Operations will continue to house staff specialized in electoral affairs, mediation support, military affairs, police, rule of law, civil affairs, security sector reform, mine action and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The proposed Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and of Peace Operations will also continue to support gender mainstreaming through their gender capacities, working closely with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women). Examples of flexible mechanisms that allow for the relevant expertise to be available at the appropriate time are the Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisers, the newly established High-level Advisory Board on Mediation, the United Nations single electoral roster, multidisciplinary teams deployed through the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis Situations, the UNDP ExpRes Roster for Crisis Response, UN-Women regional advisers on women and peace and security and capacities deployed under the joint project of UNDP, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs on United Nations transitions in mission settings. The three regional special political missions in Central Africa, West Africa and Central Asia and the regional presence of agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system are also important sources of advice and support in this regard. I will build upon these existing good practices in the provision of appropriate expertise and surge capacities

to resident coordinators, United Nations country teams and peace operations to support national needs, including by encouraging all entities to work in effective cross-pillar partnerships.

IV. Financing for peacebuilding

38. In the twin resolutions, Member States recognized the need for United Nations peacebuilding efforts, including those of United Nations country teams and the peacebuilding components of peacekeeping operations and special political missions, to have adequate, predictable and sustained financing in the face of challenges that included fragmentation across the system, competition for resources, lack of risk tolerance and speed, weak links between analysis and implementation, and insufficient dedicated resources to address conflict risks, including in transition settings.

39. Financing United Nations peacebuilding activities should be seen against the backdrop of total financial resources available for countries affected by violent conflict. Nearly half of all people living in extreme poverty reside in countries affected by conflict and fragility. Unless concerted action is taken by 2030, that figure is expected to rise to 80 per cent by 2035. The trend is discouraging: official development assistance (ODA) to conflict-affected countries[1] fell as a share of global ODA from 40 per cent (equivalent to $44.6 billion[2]) in 2005 to 28 per cent (equivalent to $41.4 billion) in 2015. The focus on peacebuilding in conflict-affected countries has declined, from 18.0 per cent of ODA in 2009 to 13.0 per cent in 2015 (see figure I). By contrast, net financial outflows from conflict-affected countries were estimated at $53 billion in 2016. Annually, less than 2 per cent of ODA to conflict-affected settings was allocated to advancing gender equality or meeting women's rights and needs. The international community needs to make financing for development work for fragile and conflict-affected countries. I therefore encourage Member States to support Governments in planning and financing their national implementation plans with regard to the Sustainable Development Goals. On the United Nations side, as I have stressed in my report on repositioning the United Nations development system, the United Nations will take steps to scale up its capacities to support Member States in their efforts in financing the Goals.

[1] Countries with country-specific special political missions or a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, or that are eligible for or are recipients of Peacebuilding Fund funding as of September 2017.

[2] Constant prices of 2015.

Figure I
Official development assistance for conflict-affected countries, 2005–2015



Source: Peacebuilding Support Office, based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Creditor Reporting System, OECD.Stat.

40. As I have noted repeatedly since assuming office, the costs of responding to crises have become unsustainably high: the international community spent $233 billion over the past 10 years on humanitarian responses, peacekeeping and in-donor refugee costs. According to the United Nations-World Bank joint study, entitled *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, it is estimated that effective prevention would save anywhere from $5 billion to $70 billion per year for the affected country and the international community combined. Investing in prevention pays off. It saves lives, money and development gains. But the United Nations does not have sufficient resources to support Member States in preventing violent conflict. For example, 2015 and 2016 annual allocations for a total of 15 Headquarters-based United Nations trust funds and global programmes related to peace amounted to approximately $200 million, according to available reports on them, far less than what is needed.

41. In contexts in which peacekeeping operations are present, notable progress has been made in the allocation of resources from peacekeeping mission assessed budgets for mandated programmatic activities in support of peacebuilding. This support now totals approximately $250 million annually, of which approximately $180 million is directed towards mine action and the rest towards activities such as community violence reduction and promotion of the rule of law. These activities are implemented directly by peacekeeping missions and other partners on the basis of their comparative advantages. I welcome existing budgetary allocation for programmatic activities in peacekeeping budgets as valuable support to peacebuilding.

42. Despite such progress, there remains a significant gap in resources and capacities to fulfil the peacebuilding components of mission mandates and meet broader national peacebuilding needs. In 2016, according to a recovery and peacebuilding assessment in the Central African Republic, the costs for peacebuilding and recovery between 2017 and 2021 were estimated at $3.2 billion, with $2.2 billion pledged by donors in November 2016. In Liberia, in the context of the drawdown of UNMIL, the financial estimate for the work of the United Nations country team in

support of the national peacebuilding plan over two years is $130 million, with $10 million pledged by the Peacebuilding Fund by December 2017.

43. An emerging good practice is the establishment of pooled funds at the country level in support of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, linked to a national peacebuilding plan, accompanied by the Peacebuilding Commission and supported by the Peacebuilding Fund in its catalytic role. Pooled funds have a strong track record in strengthening coherence and coordination; broadening the contributor base; improving risk management and leverage; empowering the resident coordinator and providing incentives for collaboration, including across United Nations pillars, thus encouraging integrated programming. They are particularly useful ahead of a mission drawdown. Pooled funds should be supported by a country-level, nationally owned mapping of peacebuilding resource needs and total financial resources available, including national resources. I encourage United Nations senior leadership to map peacebuilding resource needs, on the basis of a joined-up risk analysis, and to establish a country-specific pooled fund in support of the Framework. Fragmented financial streams can also be linked to planning and programming through country platforms. For example, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility, supported by the World Bank and the United Nations, binds the international community together in mutual accountability with Somali counterparts through a joint governance and secretariat structure overseeing separate funds.

44. While financial support for peacebuilding activities is indispensable, the contribution of in-kind resources can also be significant. The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation has implemented integrated peace and development approaches in Burundi, Chad, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Timor-Leste with support from UNDP and United Nations Volunteers and partners such as the Islamic Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchange. I encourage United Nations senior leadership to support South-South and triangular cooperation in peacebuilding.

45. At the Headquarters level, it is essential to ensure that adequate, predictable and sustained financing is available to support peacebuilding at the country level. Non-core resources are important but also increase transaction costs, fragmentation, competition and overlap. Yet, these earmarked contributions have grown six times faster than core contributions to United Nations development system entities in the past 15 years, reducing core resources to only 15 per cent of the total. In response to this challenge, I have proposed a funding compact to Member States to explore options that could help to improve the quality and predictability of resources allocated to the United Nations, in return for greater effectiveness, transparency and accountability for system-wide results.

46. In order to help to address issues of fragmentation and competition among funding instruments and to enhance transparency, accountability and effectiveness, I will also establish a funding dashboard for peacebuilding. The dashboard will serve to catalogue existing instruments, including their capitalization, rules and procedures, governance structures and areas of intervention. The dashboard will allow the Executive Committee, relevant inter-agency coordination mechanisms and senior leadership, including in the field, to track global peacebuilding resources, and will promote greater strategic alignment of funding. It will also allow for more accurate tracking of the Organization's own commitments, including to ensure that 15 per cent of funding in this area is earmarked for gender equality and women's empowerment as a principal objective. I will continue to encourage greater coordination among these funding instruments, including through joint assessments and common initiatives.

47. The Peacebuilding Fund, as a timely, catalytic and risk tolerant instrument, is a critical vehicle as the United Nations steps up its efforts to build resilience and drive,

at a greater scale, integrated United Nations action for prevention. The Fund has supported national partners and United Nations country teams in responding strategically to peacebuilding needs, aiding transitions from mission to non-mission settings and facilitating alignment with international financial institutions and other partners. The role of the Fund as a financial catalyst for peacebuilding must therefore be enhanced further. At the country level, the Fund's investments should be leveraged to maximize investments from other stakeholders. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an initial $12 million Fund contribution for stabilization was more than doubled by additional contributions from donors. In Sri Lanka, an initial $12 million Fund investment mobilized five other donors to support the $82 million peacebuilding priority plan. Financial forecasting for the Fund, based on country-driven needs across several windows — including support for transitions, private sector engagement, cross-border and regional initiatives, and a gender and youth initiative — places the estimated total requirements for the Fund at $500 million annually. I therefore reiterate my call for a "quantum leap" in contributions to the Fund, which should be unearmarked and provided for a longer term to ensure that support is both responsive and predictable.

48. Ensuring a dedicated minimum of 15 per cent of all United Nations-managed funding in support of peacebuilding projects to advance gender equality and women's empowerment as a principal objective is part of my Seven-Point Action Plan on Gender-Responsive Peacebuilding. This has been furthered through dedicated instruments, such as the Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund, as well as through earmarking within country-level trust funds such as the Myanmar Joint Peace Fund and the Stabilization Coherence Fund for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which have adopted the 15 per cent target. The Peacebuilding Fund reached 19.2 per cent in 2016 and raised the target to 30 per cent in its business plan for the period 2017–2019. I request that all United Nations funding mechanisms in support of peacebuilding projects meet and exceed this 15 per cent target and that Member States contribute specifically in this area, where resources are scarce but the impact great.

49. In the resolutions, I was requested to provide options on increasing, restructuring and better prioritizing funding dedicated to United Nations peacebuilding activities, including through assessed and voluntary contributions, for the consideration of Member States. The options are set out below:

(a) **Voluntary resources.** A number of Headquarters-level trust funds in the Secretariat are inactive and unutilized. To support the financing of the Peacebuilding Fund, I call upon donors to agree to allocate the remaining balance of any Headquarters-level trust fund inactive for two years or more to the Fund;

(b) **Assessed contributions.** These would provide higher predictability and sustainability of funding for peacebuilding, and reduce the costs of voluntary resource mobilization. It is important to note that the use of assessed contributions would send a powerful signal regarding the commitment of all Member States to peacebuilding and sustaining peace;

(c) **Assessed contributions during mission drawdowns.** Mission transitions and drawdowns represent some of the most critical periods and the time during which investments in sustaining peace made by national authorities and their international partners over the years can be either sustained or lost in a matter of months. After a drawdown, United Nations country teams commonly face a "financial cliff" in support for peacebuilding activities. In the case of Liberia, the financial estimate in support of the peacebuilding plan is $65 million per year for two years, or approximately 55 per cent per year of the final full-year budget of UNMIL in the amount of $116.95 million. In recognition of the imperative of well-managed and appropriately resourced transitions, I call upon the principal contributors to peacekeeping budgets to voluntarily commit the equivalent of 15 per cent of the final

full-year budget of a closing peacekeeping mission, to be contributed to peacebuilding activities through existing projects or the country-level pooled fund managed by the resident coordinator office, each year for a period of two years following the end of the mission's mandate;

(d) **Unspent assessed contributions.** Peacekeeping missions are sometimes left with unencumbered balances at the end of the financial period. At the end of the 2015/16 period, the balance amounted to $279 million, which was credited to Member States as unspent funds. I call upon Member States to voluntarily commit unspent peacekeeping budget funds to the Peacebuilding Fund;

(e) **Assessed contributions for the Peacebuilding Fund.** In its report, the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture recommended that the General Assembly consider steps to ensure that core funding representing $100 million or an approximate and symbolic 1 per cent of the value (whichever is higher) of the total United Nations budgets for peace operations (peacekeeping and special political missions together) be provided to the Fund annually from assessed contributions under the United Nations budget. The assessed contributions should be provided in a way that ensures necessary oversight without undermining the Fund's comparative advantage as a fast, unearmarked, flexible and pre-positioned pooled fund working under terms of reference approved by the General Assembly. I call upon Member States to consider the allocation of assessed contributions to the value of $100 million or a symbolic 1 per cent of the total annual cost of peace operations to the Fund;

(f) **Re-investing savings from assessed budgets.** When the overall financial requirements for peacekeeping operations decrease, some of the variance should be reinvested in peacebuilding. In years when the total approved resources for peacekeeping operations are less than those of the previous year, I call upon Member States to agree to be assessed the equivalent of 15 per cent of the total variance in the approved resources to finance the Peacebuilding Fund;

(g) **Diversifying available resources.** I am exploring the possibility of innovative financing solutions for peacebuilding, including contributions by individuals, foundations and faith-based organizations, bonds, levy and tax-based revenue generation, corporate partnership and blended finance. There are already several promising examples, which include social impact bonds to pay for rehabilitation centres in Mali, corporate partnerships for sustaining peace in Nigeria and South Sudan, and crowdfunded peacebuilding initiatives.

50. The United Nations mobilizes more than $250 million annually from corporate partners and is engaging with the private sector on setting investment guidelines and on a wide range of other issues through the United Nations Global Compact. I welcome recent initiatives to strengthen partnerships for peacebuilding. In 2017, the fourth Business for Peace annual conference was held in Colombia. Colombia will become a test case for blended finance, using grant money to unleash commercial financing for peacebuilding. In Liberia, companies supported the project design and financially contributed to an initiative to mitigate concession-related conflicts. I encourage the United Nations system to further develop partnerships with the private sector and the investment community to strengthen the peacebuilding impact of companies, set conflict-sensitive investment guidelines and explore potential contributions to United Nations peacebuilding activities. This should be undertaken in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework.

51. To support this ongoing work, the Peacebuilding Fund, working closely with the United Nations Sustainable Development Group, will assume a strategic resource mobilization role for predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding. This

would include exploring opportunities for contributions from the private sector through traditional means, as well as considering partnerships and innovative financing methods. This capacity will work in coordination with the proposed United Nations development system innovative funding lab. The Fund will explore the possibility of establishing a web-based donation mechanism, the use of crowdfunding websites and establishing partnerships with companies to mobilize voluntary levies on products or services.

52. I also encourage Member States to explore innovative means of financing peacebuilding activities, including through the issuance of social impact bonds in peacebuilding, the voluntary implementation of a tax on the trade in (specific) arms, or the donation of fines imposed on defence industry corporations to United Nations peacebuilding activities.

V. Partnerships for peacebuilding and sustaining peace

53. An ecosystem of partners working in support of Governments is critical for sustaining peace, as recognized by Member States in the resolutions. Regional and subregional organizations play a key role in the peaceful settlement of disputes, including through preventive diplomacy, confidence-building and mediation efforts, preventing violent extremism, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. They also share knowledge, analytical capacity and strong local networks. African initiatives in peacebuilding, for example, include the African Union policy on post-conflict reconstruction and development and the African Solidarity Initiative. A Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security was signed in 2017, and a subsequent memorandum of understanding adopted between the African Union Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office.

54. Through the Peacebuilding Commission, Member States have enhanced collaboration with regional and subregional organizations, including on the Sahel, Central Africa and the Great Lakes region, as well as in the Gambia. I encourage the Commission to continue to regularly convene meetings on country-specific and regional issues with regional and subregional organizations.

55. The United Nations engages regularly in joint analysis, planning and information-sharing with regional organizations, as well as direct collaboration. It has also increased the number of liaison offices to regional and subregional partners, including the African Union, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Southern African Development Community. The proposed new peace and security pillar will continue to prioritize such strategic partnerships and ensure that regional special political missions in Central Africa, West Africa, and Central Asia continue to hold regular thematic intergovernmental dialogues with regional and subregional organizations and strengthen joint analysis, planning and activities in support of sustaining peace. I encourage system-wide engagement with regional and subregional organizations on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, with a focus on regular dialogue, enhanced information-sharing, improved coordination, and joint approaches and activities, on the basis of comparative advantages.

56. Sustaining peace requires much closer collaboration between the United Nations and international financial institutions. I am committed to continuing to develop the Organization's partnership with the World Bank and other international financial institutions. The United Nations has already made great strides in partnership with the World Bank, building on the complementarity between the Organization's implementation capacity, security operations, deep-field presence and normative frameworks, and the World Bank's significant financial resources and technical

expertise. This comes at a time when the World Bank is investing heavily in conflict-affected countries, as the International Development Association window doubled its allocation to countries affected by violent conflict to $14.4 billion for the period 2017–2020.

57. In April 2017, the President of the World Bank and I signed the United Nations-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations, according to which the two institutions are jointly committed to identifying and reducing critical multidimensional risks of crisis and to preventing violent conflict. Building upon this framework, I will work with the President of the World Bank to ensure the operationalization and implementation of the partnership framework for crisis-affected countries, including through consideration of appropriate follow-up to the United Nations-World Bank study, *Pathways for Peace*. The partnership framework remains open for the participation of other international financial institutions.

58. Pilot projects at the country level suggest that an institutionalized partnership between the United Nations and the World Bank can unlock significant financial flows towards peacebuilding and sustaining peace. In Yemen, with support from the United Nations-World Bank partnership trust fund, a World Bank staff member was deployed to the Office of my Special Envoy for Yemen to support continued World Bank engagement. An International Development Association allocation of $819 million was made for Yemeni institutions, community support and national capacities, implemented by UNDP, UNICEF and the World Health Organization. In the Central African Republic, Somalia and Yemen, methodologies are being piloted for joint analysis and planning across humanitarian, peace, and development actors including the World Bank. Such collaboration will also be needed in contexts such as the Sahel, to promote resilience and sustainable development, and strengthen local capacity to implement financing from the World Bank, African Development Bank and Islamic Development Bank.

59. Community-level engagement by the United Nations is another critical component of sustaining peace. Developing participatory approaches that involve civil society and local communities is instrumental in peacebuilding as well as in preventing violent extremism and addressing the conditions conducive to terrorism. This is already taking place in different forms in many contexts but should be continuous and systematic. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is developing a community-engagement framework, currently piloted in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. In Malawi, the United Nations has supported conflict prevention at the local level through a pool of trained youth and a women's peacebuilding network, which has been mediating conflicts over land, family conflicts and gender-based violence issues in their communities. I recommend that all United Nations peace operations and United Nations country teams develop community-engagement strategies in consultation with national and local stakeholders, particularly youth and women's groups, and that these be shared, monitored and reviewed with local actors.

60. I welcome the Peacebuilding Commission's inclusion of civil society, with an emphasis on field-based civil society organizations, in its consultations as part of its enhanced working methods. The inclusion of such organizations is now a shared practice in country-configuration meetings and during country visits of Peacebuilding Commission members. In this way, the Commission is also fulfilling its role as a bridge to help the analysis and experiences of civil society reach the Security Council.

61. United Nations engagement with civil society organizations at the country level takes many forms: building capacity, sharing good practices, producing practical tools, fostering a conducive environment for robust civil society, and active engagement in analysis, planning, programming and monitoring and evaluation. The

United Nations has developed guidelines on civil society engagement in mission settings. In consultation with civil society, guidelines on system-wide engagement with civil society for sustaining peace will be developed.

62. Since 2016, under its gender and youth promotion initiatives, the Peacebuilding Fund has supported United Nations entities and civil society organizations as direct recipients of funding, with projects totalling $40 million. In addition, all projects allocate approximately 40 per cent of funding to local civil society organizations as implementing partners. The Peacebuilding Fund is also partnering with such organizations on programme design, including in Madagascar and the Niger, and community-based monitoring and evaluation in the Niger, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka. I encourage initiatives that allow civil society organizations to be direct recipients of funding for peacebuilding activities and that specify percentages of funding to be allocated to work undertaken by local civil society organizations.

63. United Nations funding windows for civil society organizations should include a focus on youth-led organizations. I encourage the international community to tap into the peacebuilding potential of youth organizations, including by improving their access to funding, technical support and capacity-building and by providing space for youth participation in programming. It is also imperative to ensure an enabling environment for youth organizations and internal expertise to engage with youth. I ask that the proposed Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and of Peace Operations and relevant agencies, funds and programmes ensure capacity to support youth engagement on peacebuilding activities. The study on youth, peace and security progress mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 2250 (2015) will provide more specific recommendations for youth inclusion.

64. Women's organizations and networks also have important contributions to make in enabling women's leadership and participation in conflict prevention and ensuring the sustainability of women's grass-roots peacebuilding. Women's participation improves prevention efforts and overall security, especially on issues such as the prevention of violent extremism. Women's peace huts in Liberia, for example, supported by local women's organizations and UN-Women, and funded by the Peacebuilding Fund, are playing an effective role in mediating small-scale conflicts before they result in violence and in holding State security services accountable. In Burundi, Jordan, Colombia and Solomon Islands, the Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund is providing crucial resources to women's organizations to support effective community-level mediation efforts, prevention and resilience, and peace agreement implementation. As the only fund that specifically supports the work of women's organizations in prevention and response, it has already demonstrated the exponential impact per dollar in prevention through supporting women's capacities.

VI. Conclusion

65. The proposals I have made to Member States on the reform of the peace and security pillar, the repositioning of the development system and the shifting of the management paradigm have their own logic, rationale and legislative trajectories. If endorsed, they will contribute in no small measure to an Organization that is more effective in supporting Member States in preventing conflict and sustaining peace. In the present report, I have outlined the considerable progress already achieved and built on the proposed reforms to set out additional, targeted changes to ensure that the United Nations does not lose sight of the linkages between its work in peace, development, human rights and humanitarian action. Some of these changes are proposed and pending Member State approval; others, I am undertaking under my own authority.

66. Sustaining peace is first and foremost a responsibility of Member States. The mirror image of a United Nations system that is better oriented towards prevention, human rights and sustainable development is a Membership that sees these as mutually reinforcing, sovereignty-affirming and within national interests. This is a lesson the United Nations has learned time and again. Political will to sustain peace remains invaluable.

United Nations S/2018/44

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 January 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 16 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

We should like to draw attention to your letter dated 3 January 2018, to which was annexed a letter dated 3 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council that was circulated as a document of the Security Council (S/2018/5). In that connection, we should like to reiterate the substance of all the relevant communications from the Permanent Mission of Egypt addressed to President of the Security Council that were circulated as documents of the Council. The most recent of those communications was the letter from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/953).

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Amr Abdellatif **Aboulatta**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-00846 (E) 220118 220118

Please recycle

United Nations A/72/705–S/2018/45

General Assembly
Security Council

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17 January 2018

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I transmit herewith for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces along the State border of the Republic of Armenia during the month of December 2017 (see annex I).*

I also transmit herewith for your attention the record of ceasefire violations registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) during the month of December 2017 (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.

18-00799 (E) 250118

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Annex I to the letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia, 1–31 December 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 December	**Tavush, Ararat, Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik regions**	17	Small arms and light weapons: 294
	Aygedzor	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 58
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 16 (Daranak: 10; Aygedzor: 6)
	Kolagir	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 80
	Movses	1	
	Aygepar	3	
	Yeraskh	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	2	
	Khndzorut	1	
	Daranak	1	
2 December	**Tavush, Gegharkunik regions**	7	Small arms and light weapons: 186
	Chinari	1	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Movses	2	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vahan	2	
3 December	**Tavush region**	7	Small arms and light weapons: 70
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20
	Movses	2	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Kayan	1	
4 December	**Tavush region**	2	Small arms and light weapons: 20
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 2
	Vazashen	1	
5 December	**Tavush, Gegharkunik regions**	4	Small arms and light weapons: 24
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12
	Movses	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 2
	Paravakar	1	
	Kakhakn	1	
6 December	**Tavush, Gegharkunik regions**	6	Small arms and light weapons: 81
	Chinari	1	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Aygehovit	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Jil	1	
7 December	**Tavush region**	7	Small arms and light weapons: 67
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
	Paravakar	2	
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	3	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
8 December	**Tavush, Gegharkunik regions**	10	Small arms and light weapons: 93 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8 Large-calibre machine guns: 7
	Chinari	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Aygehovit	2	
	Vazashen	3	
	Berkaber	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Chambarak	1	
9 December	**Tavush region**	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 125
	Kolagir	1	
	Berdavan	1	
10 December	**Tavush region**	5	Small arms and light weapons: 22 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Aygepar	1	
	N.Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Vazashen	1	
11 December	**Tavush region**	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Chinari	1	
12 December	**Tavush region**	2	Small arms and light weapons: 5 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Movses	1	
	Kayan	1	
13 December	**Tavush, Gegharkunik regions**	5	Small arms and light weapons: 58 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 12 (Aygedzor)
	Aygedzor	1	
	Movses	1	
	Aygehovit	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Chambarak	1	
14 December	**Tavush, Gegharkunik regions**	8	Small arms and light weapons: 64 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre machine guns: 60
	Aygedzor	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Baghanis	1	
	Voskevan	1	
	Jil	1	
	Kakhakn	2	
15 December	**Tavush region**	15	Small arms and light weapons: 565 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 23 (Kolagir: 10; Aygedzor: 8; Paravakar: 5) Large-calibre machine guns: 20
	Chinari	4	
	Aygedzor	2	
	Kolagir	1	
	Movses	1	
	Aygepar	4	
	Kayan	2	
	Berkaber	1	
16 December	**Tavush region**	3	Small arms and light weapons: 18
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	2	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
17 December	**Tavush region**	9	Small arms and light weapons: 61
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Paravakar	2	
	Aygepar	2	
	Movses	1	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	2	
	Vazgashen	1	
18 December	**Syunik region**	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 70
	Chaqan	1	
19 December	**Tavush region**	1	Small arms and light weapons: 4
	Aygedzor	1	
20 December	**Tavush, Syunik regions**	3	Small arms and light weapons: 65
	Kolagir	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Baghanis)
	Baghanis	1	
	Chapar	1	
21 December	**Tavush region**	4	Small arms and light weapons: 48
	Chinari	2	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Aygepar	1	
22 December	**Tavush, Ararat regions**	9	Small arms and light weapons: 88
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 30
	Kayan	1	
	Vazgashen	1	
	Kirants	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Farsyr Sevak	1	
23 December	There were no shots.		
24 December	**Tavush region**	1	Small arms and light weapons: 7
	Kayan	1	
25 December	**Tavush region**	3	Small arms and light weapons: 27
	Chapar	1	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Koti	1	
26 December	**Tavush region**	1	Small arms and light weapons: 4
	Vazgashen	1	
27 December	**Tavush region**	2	Small arms and light weapons: 22
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazgashen	1	
28 December	**Gegharkunik region**	2	Small arms and light weapons: 110
	Jil	2	
29 December	**Tavush region**	2	Small arms and light weapons: 47
	Aygedzor	1	
	Paravakar	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
30 December	**Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions**	4	Small arms and light weapons: 33
	Chinari	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Jil	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
31 December	**Tavush, Ararat regions**	8	
	Aygedzor	2	Small arms and light weapons: 57
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 10
	Barekamavan	1	
	Baghanis	1	
	Yeraskh	2	

Annex II to the letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic), 1–31 December 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 415 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Talish)
2 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 237 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Mehdili)
3 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 254
4 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 311 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Grenade launchers: 1
5 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 554 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
6 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 113 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli)
7 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	15	Small arms and light weapons: 108 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Karachuk)
8 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	11	Small arms and light weapons: 65 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
9 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	11	Small arms and light weapons: 84 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 14
10 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 250 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Horadiz) Grenade launchers: 1
11 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	14	Small arms and light weapons: 99 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
12 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 181 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 36 (Ashaghi Veysali: 1; Shikhlyar: 35) Large-calibre machine guns: 30 (Yarmja)
13 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 400 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 56 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Shikhlyar) Large-calibre machine guns: 5
14 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 391 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Nuzger: 3; Karvend: 7; Karakhanbeyli: 1)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
15 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 354 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Karakhanbeyli: 2; Karvend: 5) Large-calibre machine guns: 8
16 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 564 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17
17 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	34	Small arms and light weapons: 413 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 36 Large-calibre machine guns: 1
18 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	31	Small arms and light weapons: 218 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 62 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Levonarkh)
19 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 218 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Karakhanbeyli)
20 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 163 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Kengerli: 2; Geytap: 2; Talish: 4) Large-calibre machine guns: 20
21 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 297 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17
22 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 201 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 34 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Gjulistan) Large-calibre machine guns: 7
23 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	14	Small arms and light weapons: 166
24 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 260 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Gjulistan)
25 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	38	Small arms and light weapons: 382 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Karachuk: 9; Talish: 1)
26 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 172 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Bash Karvend: 3; Jraberd: 2) Large-calibre machine guns: 50
27 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 377 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 44 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 23 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli: 3; Karachuk: 2; Shikhlyar: 14; Gjulistan: 4) Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Levonarkh)
28 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 195 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 22 (Shikhlyar)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
29 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	39	Small arms and light weapons: 350 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Namerli: 1; Karachuk: 2)
30 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	30	Small arms and light weapons: 230 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 17 (Shikhlyar: 4; Gjulistan: 13) Large-calibre machine guns: 40
31 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	31	Small arms and light weapons: 388 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18

During the reporting period, two soldiers of the Defence Army of Artsakh were wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.

United Nations S/2018/46

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 January 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 18 January 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, and in accordance with article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, which provides that any Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute or situation the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, I write to you regarding recent incidents in which Qatar has put the security and safety of international civil aviation at risk.

Recently, the State of Qatar has insisted on carrying out acts that threaten the safety of airline flights operating under the flag of the United Arab Emirates, thereby putting the lives of their passengers at risk. Those scheduled flights were intercepted as they were flying along regular internationally agreed flight paths. That is made plain by the details of the following two incidents:

1. On Monday, 15 January 2018, at 0633 hours UTC, Qatari combat aircraft took off from the State of Qatar and crossed the path of regularly scheduled Emirates airline flight UAE837/EK837, which was using the customary flight path UP699, with 213 passengers on board.

2. On that same day at 0705 hours UTC, two Qatari combat aircraft flew within three nautical miles behind an Etihad Airways aircraft making regularly scheduled flight ETD23B/EY371 from Abu Dhabi to the Kingdom of Bahrain, with 85 passengers on board. It was flying along the customary flight path UP699, which is used by all international airlines, including Etihad Airways and Emirates.

It should be noted that the State of Qatar did not send any advance navigation notice to civilian flights. Nor did it register any objection to the flight paths of the two above-mentioned aircraft, despite having advance knowledge thereof. Please find annexed maps illustrating the above-described incidents. It should be noted that the United Arab Emirates has notified the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) of these two incidents in accordance with established air navigation security and safety procedures.

In addition to the preceding, I should like to draw attention to the fact that simultaneously with the two aforementioned civilian flights, there were other civilian flights from other States that were not intercepted by Qatari combat aircraft. That proves beyond any doubt that the Qatari combat aircraft deliberately intended to intercept the two United Arab Emirates flights as opposed to any others, in an unacceptable provocation and an unwarranted escalation on the part of the State of

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Qatar that affects the security and safety of civilian flights and could lead to serious incidents that would pose a dire threat to the lives of passengers.

The above-mentioned regrettable and serious incidents, the deliberate Qatari threat to the freedom of international air navigation, and the threat posed to the safety of civilian passengers all constitute behaviour that might ultimately lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute in the sense provided for in Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Lastly, the United Arab Emirates would like to reaffirm its full commitment to the security and safety of international air navigation and its absolute compliance with the international laws, principles and procedures applicable in that regard.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(*Signed*) Saud Hamad **Alshamsi**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex to the letter dated 18 January 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council




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United Nations A/72/709–S/2018/47

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
22 January 2018

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 72 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 16 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine of 16 January 2018 regarding the decision of the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea in the case of Volodymyr Balukh (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72 (c), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-00973 (E) 250118

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Annex to the letter dated 16 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding the decision of the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea in the case of Volodymyr Balukh

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its resolute protest over the illegal and politically motivated decision of the so-called "court" of the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea in the case of citizen of Ukraine Volodymyr Balukh.

Sentencing Volodymyr Balukh to three years and seven months in a penal colony under absurd and fabricated charges the Kremlin has again testified to its unwillingness to give up the policy of targeted repressions and intimidations against the Ukrainian citizens in the temporarily occupied Crimean peninsula.

We urge the aggressor and occupant state to halt violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the residents of the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory and to immediately release Volodymyr Balukh and other illegally detained citizens of Ukraine.

Russia must stop the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and implement to their full the resolutions of the UN General Assembly "Territorial integrity of Ukraine" of 27 March 2014, "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)" of 19 December 2016 and of 19 December 2017 as well as the order of the International Court of Justice regarding provisional measures in the case of Ukraine vs Russia regarding the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

We call on our international partners to intensify political and diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin in order to make the occupant state to stop criminal oppression and persecutions of Ukrainian citizens in the occupied Crimea and to withdraw from the sovereign territories of Ukraine.

United Nations A/72/708–S/2018/48

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
22 January 2018

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 72 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 16 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine of 16 January 2018 regarding the illegal transfer of Ukrainian citizens from the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72 (c), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-00975 (E) 250118

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Annex to the letter dated 16 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the illegal transfer of Ukrainian citizens from the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its strong protest against the illegal transfer to the Russian Federation of the citizens of Ukraine Muslim Aliev, Emir-Usein Kuku, Vadym Siruk, Enver Bekirov, Refat Alimov and Arsen Dzhepparov detained on the territory of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea under trumped-up charges in terrorist activities.

In accordance with the norms of international humanitarian law the occupying power is forbidden from forceful transfer of citizens of the occupied state to the territory of the occupying power. The commission by the state-occupant of such unlawful actions entails its international legal responsibility.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine demands from the Russian side to stop the practice of illegal transfer of Ukrainian citizens from the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol to the Russian Federation and immediately return them to the territory of Ukraine.

United Nations S/2018/49

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 January 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 18 January 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 2360 (2017), adopted on 21 June 2017, by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo until 1 August 2018.

In connection with my letter dated 4 August 2017 (S/2017/683), I wish to inform you that, after consulting with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I have appointed Mr. Nelson Alusala, natural resources/finance expert (Kenya), to replace Mr. Roberto Sollazzo (Italy), who resigned from the Group.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

18-00905 (E) 220118

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United Nations S/2018/50

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 January 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 11 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to write to you with regard to the summary statement by the Secretary-General of matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration, dated 2 January 2018 (S/2018/10).

In this regard, I have the honour to inform you that, upon the instructions of my Government, the Kingdom of the Netherlands requests that the following item, listed in paragraph 3 of the above-mentioned document, remain on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized:

69. The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Karel J.G. **van Oosterom**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-00909 (E) 230118

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United Nations S/2018/51

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 January 2018

Original: English

Identical letters dated 19 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to submit herewith a table clarifying the number of civilians killed and injured as a result of terrorist attacks, including those involving mortar shells and explosive devices, committed or launched by armed terrorist groups against safe neighbourhoods in different Syrian cities and areas, during the period from 22 November to 21 December 2017.

Governorate	*Total number of civilians killed*	*Number of children killed*	*Total number of civilians injured*	*Number of children injured*
Aleppo	5	3	21	10
Damascus	8	3	53	11
Dar'a	–	–	10	6
Dayr al-Zawr	–	–	2	–
Hama	1	1	8	6
Hasakah	2	1	2	2
Homs	9	1	14	2
Idlib	–	–	–	–
Ladhiqiyah	–	–	–	–
Qunaytirah	–	–	1	1
Raqqah	–	–	–	–
Rif Dimashq	1	–	13	1
Suwayda'	11	–	4	1
Tartus	–	–	–	–
Total	**37**	**9**	**128**	**40**

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-00990 (E) 240118

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United Nations S/2018/ 2

Security Council

Distr.: General
23 January 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 19 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to inform you that, at 2012 hours on Tuesday, 16 January 2018, Royal Saudi Air Defence forces became aware that the Houthi militias loyal to Iran had launched a ballistic missile from Yemeni territory towards the city of Jazan in Saudi Arabia. Defence forces intercepted and destroyed the missile, which had been deliberately aimed at densely-populated civilian areas.

This act of aggression on the part of the armed Houthi group, which is backed by Iran, shows that the Iranian regime continues to support the group with sophisticated capabilities in clear and open defiance of Security Council resolutions 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015) with a view to undermining the security of Saudi Arabia, the region and the world. Launching ballistic missiles at densely-populated cities and towns is also a violation of international humanitarian law.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia once again calls on the international community to take effective and more earnest steps to bring an end to the bare-faced violations committed by Iran, which continues to smuggle ballistic missiles and weapons to terrorist outlaw groups. The international community must hold Iran accountable for supporting the violation of norms, flagrantly defying international values and undermining regional and international security.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdallah Y. **Al-Mouallimi**
Permanent Representative

18-01068 (E) 250118 250118

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United Nations S/2018/53

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 January 2018

Original: English

Identical letters dated 20 January 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am instructed by my Government to bring the following to your attention.

As the armed conflict in Syria continues unabated in its seventh year, the spillover effects of the war have exceeded the borders of Syria and its immediate vicinity. The terrorist organizations that have found fertile ground remain a serious threat to regional and international security, as well as to the territorial integrity of Syria.

The national security of Turkey has been under direct threat from the Syria-based terrorist organizations, among which Deash and the PKK/KCK Syria affiliate, PYD/YPG, are at the top of the list.

In countering the threat of terrorism, our response has always been proportionate, measured and in line with the right of self-defence, as defined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Accordingly, Turkey successfully concluded Operation Euphrates Shield last year, through which 2,015 km^2 of land was cleared of Deash and a safe haven free of terror could be established, which enabled some of the displaced Syrians to return safely and voluntarily to their homes.

However, the threat of terrorism from Syria targeting our borders has not ended. The recent increase in rocket attacks and harassment fire directed at Hatay and Kilis provinces of Turkey from the Afrin region of Syria, which is under the control of the PKK/KCK/PYD/YPG terrorist organization, has resulted in the deaths of many civilians and soldiers and has left many more wounded.

The risk of Deash elements infiltrating Turkey via this area and targeting the security of Turkey as well as the European countries is also heightened owing to the recent movements of Deash terrorists coming into the Afrin region from other parts of Syria.

In order to counter this terrorist threat, Turkey initiated a military operation on 20 January 2018 against these terrorist elements. The operation is aimed at ensuring our border security, neutralizing terrorists in Afrin and saving the brotherly Syrians. Accordingly, the operation will target only terrorists and their hideouts, shelters, emplacements, weapons, vehicles and equipment. All precautions have been taken to avoid collateral damage.

18-00963 (E) 240118

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This measure was essential in order to ensure the border security of Turkey and our national security based on our right of self-defence, as defined in Article 51 of the Charter, but also within the context of the responsibility attributed to Member States in the fight against terrorism, including through Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014).

I would like to underline that Turkey, which is unequivocally committed to the territorial integrity and political unity of Syria, is undertaking this measure with a view to contributing to and furthering these basic principles.

Turkey remains staunchly committed to finding a political solution to the conflict in Syria through a genuine political transition, as outlined in the Geneva communique and Security Council resolution 2254 (2015), and will continue its dauntless efforts to make this a reality as soon as possible.

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Güven **Begeç**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations A/72/714–S/2018/54

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
30 January 2018

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 99 (l)
General and complete disarmament: implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 22 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the comment by the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on US attempts to distort Russian approaches to investigating the use of chemical weapons in Syria (see annex). I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, under agenda item 99 (l).

(*Signed*) Vassily **Nebenzia**

18-01400 (E) 060218

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Annex to the letter dated 22 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Comment by the Information and Press Department on US attempts to distort Russian approaches to investigating the use of chemical weapons in Syria

19-01-2018

On January 9, the US delegation circulated an unofficial document, "Assessment of the Russian Federation's Positions Regarding the Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria", at the UN Security Council with US assessments of Russia's stance regarding the use of chemical weapons and toxic chemicals in Syria. Having studied it, we are compelled to state that this document bears no resemblance to reality and completely distorts our country's approaches to investigating such incidents.

Unfortunately, in this document, our US colleagues have stooped to outright distortions of the facts. It appears that they didn't give a second thought to the substance of their far-fetched allegations either from the standpoint of professional ethics or basic common sense. The real state of affairs in the investigation by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the UN of continuing incidents involving extremists using toxic chemicals and full-fledged chemical warfare agents in Syria has been distorted.

Therefore, we cannot regard the document prepared by the United States as anything other than an attempt to mislead readers. Especially considering that the Russian position on the chemical incident on April 4, 2017 in the Syrian town of Khan Sheikhoun, based on professional findings of specialists, was clearly and thoroughly described in the materials of a joint press conference of representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia.

In order of priority of the claims brought against Russia by the United States, we would like to focus on the following.

1. Not a single Russian official has ever unequivocally stated that sarin used in Khan Sheikhoun was brought from Iraq or Libya.

Over the past several years, Russia, together with China, has consistently tried to draw the attention of the international community to continuing cases of chemical terrorism in the Middle East, and to push for the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution condemning these barbarous crimes in Syria and Iraq. However, each time these proposals were met with strong opposition from our Western partners who are permanent members of the Council, who prefer to accuse the lawful Syrian government of using chemical weapons without providing any proof thereof.

Russia has regularly called for conducting objective and professional investigations into incidents involving the use of poisonous and toxic substances as weapons. We have insisted on studying all scenarios of events without exception, strictly observing the procedure for preserving material evidence, establishing causal relations, and comparing the composition of chemicals and delivery channels, including in the context of signals coming from Syria about illegal imports of components for making chemical weapons.

With regard to Libya's chemical arsenals, we know even from open sources that in 2011 a number of artillery shells with chemical warfare agents disappeared from Rabta chemical weapons storage facility, some of which were subsequently used during inter-tribal clashes.

With regard to chemical weapons in Iraq, all questions on this matter should primarily be addressed to the United States and Great Britain, which have undertaken to destroy several thousand of such munitions in that country in 2003–2009 without proper international control and in violation of the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC). Instead of making groundless accusations against other states, Washington and London should have provided the OPCW with exhaustive information about these unauthorised activities and handed over the samples of poisonous substances that were eliminated in Iraq in order to conduct their comparative analysis with samples taken at the scene of the incidents in Syria.

2. The Syrian authorities have repeatedly and persistently invited experts from the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission to investigate possible use of chemical weapons in Syria (FFM) and the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) to visit Khan Sheikhoun and Shairat air base for proper investigative measures.

The day after the incident in Khan Sheikhoun, the US side requested that we assist in obtaining the Syrian authorities' permission for an OPCW inspection at Shairat air base, where, Washington claimed, sarin allegedly used by the Syrian Air Force was stored. Damascus immediately gave permission but it was not used. Instead, on the night of April 7, 2017 in breach of the UN Charter and basic principles of international law, the United States committed an act of aggression against a sovereign state by launching a massive rocket strike on Shairat.

On April 11, 2017, the Government of Syria, in an official letter to Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat Ahmet Uzumcu, requested that OPCW experts be sent to Khan Sheikhoun and Shairat to investigate all the circumstances of the incident. As Head of the UN Department of Safety and Security Peter Drennan confirmed later, all necessary guarantees were obtained for OPCW experts' visit to Khan Sheikhoun from the armed opposition that controlled it. As for Shairat, there were no obstacles whatsoever to a trip to the base.

Nevertheless, neither FFM representatives, nor JIM experts paid a visit to Khan Sheikhoun. Only half a year later did a JIM team visit Shairat just to question its staff, verify Syrian Air Force flight records and study aircraft bomb suspension devices on SU-22 planes. The JIM experts did not even try to collect samples for tests for the presence of sarin, which could, once and for all, either confirm or refute the US version of the Khan Sheikhoun incident. The impression was that they were not the least interested in establishing the truth.

Our US colleagues insist that after the samples collected by supporters of the Syrian authorities in Khan Sheikhoun and tested at the OPCW revealed the presence of admixtures allegedly characteristic only of Syria's former chemical weapons programme, the question of whether a trip by international experts to the scene of the incident was expedient was altogether dropped. Using this strange logic, it would seem that the Government of Syria deliberately put its people at risk in a terrorist-controlled area in order to procure evidence of its own guilt.

3. The final report of the OPCW Fact Finding Mission on Khan Sheikhoun, which the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism largely relied on in its further work, directly acknowledges that this special OPCW mission could not fully guarantee the security of samples received from the Syrian opposition according to procedures required by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We agree only with US the conclusion that the Khan Sheikhoun incident is not an exception in terms of how investigations are run. The FFM and JIM relied on the same misguided practice, fundamentally contradicting CWC provisions, in carrying

out other investigations. Does not this explicit conclusion by the United States suggest that the so-called Syrian "chemical dossier" has been controversial from the start?

Moreover, the FFM's unsubstantiated refusal to visit the accident site deprived its experts of the opportunity to talk to many real witnesses and victims, investigate the explosion crater and collect evidence. As a result, the special mission mostly had to rely on falsified "evidence" and dubious records that were received from opposition groups and non-governmental organisations affiliated with them, often defying basic common sense.

It is evident that in these circumstances we cannot expect any impartiality.

4. Following a laboratory analysis of the samples taken by the Syrian authorities from the blast crater in Khan Sheikhoun with much difficulty and risk, Russia had no doubts about the fact that sarin was used there. However, there were serious doubts about JIM's conclusions concerning the way sarin was delivered and used.

As for specific traces of DF and hexamine in the Khan Sheikhoun samples that are allegedly typical of sarin produced under the former Syrian military chemical programme, we can say the following.

Russia so far has not received an answer to the question of whether the tests for the presence of possible microscopic traces discovered during the investigation due to the high sensitivity of the equipment were carried out in any other process where DF is used as a primary component for making sarin and if there are any scientific data to this effect. Without such information no explicit conclusions can be made.

In addition, after Syria joined the CWC, Damascus sent to the OPCW Technical Secretariat detailed information on the methods of making "Syrian" sarin, and a portion of the precursors for that substance was destroyed aboard the US Cape Ray based in the Mediterranean Sea. So, the recipe of Syria-made sarin has been no secret for a long time and could easily be used with the aim of organising another more elaborate provocation in Khan Sheikhoun.

5. It is noteworthy that both OPCW Fact Finding Mission segments were led by British subjects. Among nine people on the staff of the OPCW FFM, six represented NATO member states and one — a partner of NATO.

This can hardly be called "broad" geographic representation "from many continents," as the US document reads. At the same time, Russia has never doubted the qualification of the experts chosen for the OPCW FFM and has only demanded compliance with basic UN rules, which would facilitate an objective investigation.

6. Since April 2017, we have repeatedly and thoroughly made the case that the chemical incident in Khan Sheikhoun may have been staged. These materials were spread as official documents of the UN Security Council and General Assembly, as well as at the OPCW.

Unfortunately, as the seventh report made by the OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism in October 2017 showed, the JIM has not even begun seriously looking into whether the events in Khan Sheikhoun were the result of a staged provocation.

Meanwhile, many respected specialists from various countries have suggested the same.

It is noteworthy that some anonymous explosives experts the JIM hired for this investigation mistook a piece of pipe for an element of a chemical aerial bomb, despite the fact that there was no real evidence of an air strike in Khan Sheikhoun. However, it was probably planted on the blast site or was a part of the sarin container, which was exploded on the ground surface with an explosive device to imitate an air strike.

To prove the alleged chemical attack in Khan Sheikhoun, the US representatives use pieces of air ammunition the OPCW FFM received from militants and quote the report stating that the pieces had traces of "Syrian" sarin. However, it is noteworthy that these objects only appeared in autumn 2017.

To put it differently, the special mission experts have probably ordered pieces of a "chemical" bomb from the armed Syrian opposition, and it took the militants almost half a year to carry out this task. Despite such a long period, there still were some glitches, which was unfortunate for those who spread allegations about the "chemical crimes" of the Syrian authorities.

So, after the Russian experts examined photos of the fragments presented in the OPCW Fact Finding Mission report, it turned out that the overwhelming majority of them are just parts of simple aerial bombs from the arsenal of the Syrian Air Force. Moreover, the traces of severe corrosion clearly visible on the photos suggest that they were used at least five years ago. Other metal objects presented in the photos, like the deformed water pipe from Khan Sheikhoun, have absolutely nothing to do with airborne armament.

As for the flight of the Syrian Su-22 aircraft near Khan Sheikhoun, it should be recalled that the relevant objective control data graphically presented in the materials of the joint news conference of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia was first made public by Washington as an attempt to justify its missile strike at Shayrat air base. In accordance with these data and the conclusions of the Joint Investigative Mechanism's seventh report, the aircraft did not approach Khan Sheikhoun closer than 5 km, and flew perpendicular to the place of the chemical incident that was on the opposite side of the town, that is, in total at a distance of not less than 10 km.

Consequently, the question arises: How, under such circumstances, could an uncontrolled aerial bomb be at the scene of the incident? We did not find any explanations for this either in the documents of the OPCW Fact Finding Mission and the Joint Investigative Mechanism, or from our American colleagues.

7. It simply does not make any sense for the Syrian army, which is winning, to use chemical munitions in isolated instances to gain, according to the US, an advantage in local armed clashes, while inviting a harsh response from the international community.

Attempts to impose responsibility on Damascus are devoid of any logic. At the same time, in the face of the undeniable military successes of government forces, such provocations offer a last hope for the terrorists, who are being defeated, and their supporters.

To sum up, once again we call on our partners in the UN Security Council to show common sense and objectively assess the US attempts to impose on the international community a false understanding of who is responsible for chemical incidents in Syria.

United Nations S/2018/55

Security Council

Distr.: General
23 January 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 22 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing to inform you that on Saturday, 20 January 2018, at 12.38 p.m., the Saudi air defense force intercepted a ballistic missile, launched from Sa'dah by the Iranian-backed Houthi militia, targeting densely populated civilian areas in the city of Najran, in southern Saudi Arabia. This missile launch came just four days after the Houthi's last missile attack, targeting the city Jazan on 16 January 2018, as referenced in my letter to you dated 19 January 2018.

The increasingly frequent attacks by the Houthi militias on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have rightly elicited the condemnation of the international community, as evidenced most recently by the statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), dated 21 January 2018, following the 15th Extraordinary Meeting of OIC to discuss the Houthi missile attack on Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 19 December 2017. In the aforementioned statement, the Foreign Ministers condemned the Houthi attack of 19 December in the strongest terms, and also condemned Iran's violation of the resolution of the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers, adopted in the Makkah Conference in November 2016, and of relevant Security Council resolutions, by continuing to provide Iranian-backed coup militias with arms — particularly Iranian-made ballistic missiles — and denounced Iran's intervention in some countries of the region, calling on Iran to end policies which would fuel factional and sectarian conflicts and to abstain from supporting and financing terrorist groups. The statement affirmed that the OIC Member States will assist and support the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia against terrorism and any attempts to undermine its security, while calling on all OIC Member States to stand in unison against this attack and all the parties orchestrating it and supplying its perpetrators with arms, "given that any harm to the security of the Kingdom is indeed a prejudice to the security and unity of the entire Muslim world"

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other States Members of the United Nations have repeatedly shared insurmountable evidence that proves that Iran supports the Houthi terrorist militias, in particular through the smuggling of ballistic missiles into Yemen to target the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015). Iran's support for the Houthis is but one example of its destructive and divisive policies in the Middle East, which were discussed at length during the Security Council briefing on the report of the Secretary General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), held on 19 December 2017. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia calls upon the Council to uphold

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its responsibility towards the maintenance of international peace and security by condemning these Houthi ballistic missile attacks, which pose grave threats to the peace and security of the Middle East. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also calls upon the Council to unite to send a clear message to Iran that it must comply with resolution 2231 (2015) in its entirety, for the Council to comprehensively represent the true extent of Iran's violations of resolutions 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015), respectively, through the holding of a joint meeting of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and the Council in the "2231 (2015) format", and for a joint briefing by the Panel of Experts on Yemen and the Secretariat on their respective findings, as recommended by the Secretary General in his report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/1030).

My delegation requests that the present letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdallah Y. **Al-Mouallimi**
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2018/56

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 January 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 16 January 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I write to you in order to draw your attention to the identical letters dated 2 January 2018 (S/2018/6) and the identical letters dated 5 January 2018 (S/2018/23) from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council concerning the claims made by Qatar that United Arab Emirates aircraft had violated the airspace of Qatar. In that connection, I should like to transmit herewith a report from the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications of Bahrain, along with maps and other annexes, that refute, with documented evidence, the claims made by Qatar in the above-mentioned letters. After reviewing the records of the Bahrain civilian air traffic control centre, it is evident that those aircraft were flying over either the training zone of the United Arab Emirates or international waters (the exclusive economic zone), which is controlled by the Bahrain Area Control Centre, and not over the area over which Qatar claims to have sovereignty.

In view of the information set out in the above-mentioned report, I should like to highlight the following:

- With regard to the identical letters dated 2 January 2018, in which it is claimed that a United Arab Emirates warplane (serial No. 0403) violated the airspace of Qatar on 21 December 2017 by flying over the exclusive economic zone, the report of the competent Bahraini authorities makes clear the following:

  Contrary to what Qatar claims, the aircraft was flying in airspace that is part of the Bahrain flight information region, which the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has mandated Bahrain to administer in order to foster air safety above international waters (the exclusive economic zone). Article 58 of part V of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that "[i]n the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships and aircraft...". Article 87 of the part VII of the Convention provides that "[t]he high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or landlocked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: (a) freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of overflight ...".

18-01280 (E) 310118 050218

Please recycle

– With regard to the identical letters dated 5 January 2018, in which it is claimed that, on 3 January 2018, a United Arab Emirates military aircraft (call sign UAF2276, type DH-6) flew over the exclusive economic zone of Qatar, the report of the Bahrain air traffic control centre makes clear the following:

> The United Arab Emirates aircraft was flying in airspace that is part of the Bahrain flight information region and over international waters. It was heading to Sheikh Isa Airbase in Bahrain at an altitude of 8,000 feet and was in direct contact with the Bahrain flight information centre. Under radar guidance, the aircraft was directed to land at Sheikh Isa Airbase. The aircraft's flight plan had been sent in advance to the air traffic control unit of Qatar via the automated flight plan management system, in accordance with the relevant operational procedures.

On 27 December 2017, two Qatar Air Force aircraft intercepted two United Arab Emirates military transport aircraft. One of the aircraft (flight UAF812) was 37 miles from the coast of Qatar and heading to Sheikh Isa Airbase, while the other (flight UAF813) was approximately 30 nautical miles from the coast of Qatar and heading to Marka airport in Amman. In addition, Qatar air defence sent messages to two United Arab Emirates military transport aircraft instructing them to change course. The flights were UAF1211, which was 12 nautical miles from the coast of Qatar and heading to Sheikh Isa Airbase, and UAF1226, which was 45 nautical miles from the coast of Qatar and also heading to Sheikh Isa Airbase.

The area over which Qatar claims to have sovereignty and alleges that United Arab Emirates aircraft violated is within the area that is monitored by the competent authorities of Bahrain. That arrangement is in place pursuant to article 3 of the agreement concerning air traffic services that Bahrain and Qatar signed in 2000. That article provides that the contracting parties agree that the Bahrain flight information centre in Bahrain shall be responsible for monitoring aircraft movement in the airspace and above the territorial waters of Qatar (as defined in article 2 of the agreement), other than those airways or lower altitudes for which Qatar is responsible under the technical arrangements arrived at by the civil aviation authorities of the two countries, in accordance with article 4 of the agreement, which shall be reviewed with the agreement of the parties whenever operational requirements necessitate that.

Moreover, the United Arab Emirates aircraft did not violate the airspace of Qatar. All the aircraft noted in the above-mentioned report were at least 12 nautical miles from the coast of Qatar, in accordance with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, part II, section 2, article 3, which provides that "[e]very State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention".

In summary, the information contained in the report indicates that the allegations that were made by Qatar in the above-mentioned letters are unfounded. Those letters present false facts and propagate information that is incorrect and contrary to international law and instruments. They are also an unjustified escalation on the part of Qatar, which has not adhered to the principle good-neighbourly relations. The interception of United Arab Emirates aircraft by Qatari warplanes is a threat to the safety of aviation and a clear violation of international law. All the United Arab Emirates aircraft were in international airspace recognized by ICAO and in the airspace of Bahrain. What is more troublesome is that Qatar continued to attempt to communicate with the United Arab Emirates aircraft even after they had reached Sheikh Isa Airbase in Bahrain.

Qatar must therefore take care to be accurate, as engaging in such conduct and making such irresponsible claims undermines its credibility, is contrary to the

principle of good-neighbourly relations under the Charter of the United Nations, and will affect international security and peace.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annexes could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Hayfa Ali Ahmed **Matar**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex to the letter dated 16 January 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications

Report

1. At precisely 0953 hours local time on Thursday, 21 December 2017, a warplane (serial No. 0403) was observed flying over training area OMR54, which is in the airspace of the United Arab Emirates. The aircraft left the training area and travelled approximately seven miles into the airspace of the Bahrain flight information region. It circled over international waters for one minute at an altitude of 33,000 feet before turning south-east and heading back to the training area. This aircraft was not in contact with the Bahrain flight information centre (see chart No. 5).

2. Recordings of air traffic control communications from 27 December 2017 indicate that the following occurred:

- At approximately 0850 hours local time, the captain of a United Arab Emirates C-130 military transport aircraft (flight UAF1211) that was heading from Abu Dhabi Airport to Sheikh Isa Airbase said that he had received several messages from Qatar ordering him to turn right from his airway (UP699). At the time, the aircraft was approximately 50 miles north-east of Bahrain International Airport and 12 miles from the coast of Qatar. The aircraft changed course and turned right, so as to remain far from the coast of Qatar (see chart No. 1).

- At approximately 0917 hours local time, a United Arab Emirates CN-35 military transport aircraft (flight UAF812) was heading from Abu Dhabi Airport to Sheikh Isa Air Base along airway UP699. The aircraft was above point NAGOG and approximately 37 miles from the coast of Qatar when two Qatar Air Force Mirage aircraft, along with their escort, intercepted it. When the aircraft reached point VEDED, which is 15 nautical miles away from the coast of Qatar, the captain of flight UAF812 was asked to turn right, in order to avoid the airspace of Qatar. At approximately 0938 hours, when the aircraft was 8 nautical miles from point SOGAT and 18 nautical miles from the coast of Qatar, the intercepting aircraft moved away and headed to the east (see chart No. 2).

- At approximately 0939 hours local time, a United Arab Emirates CN-35 military transport aircraft (flight UAF813) was heading from Abu Dhabi to Amman (Marka airport) along airway UL768. The Bahrain air traffic control centre changed the course of the aircraft and had it fly further from the coast of Qatar, in the hope that doing so would ensure that it would not be intercepted. However, when the aircraft was 5 nautical miles away from point MODOG and approximately 30 nautical miles from the coast of Qatar, the same two Qatari aircraft intercepted it and escorted until it was 10 miles north of point SOGAT and approximately 20 nautical miles north of the coast of Qatar. At that point, the intercepting aircraft pulled away and headed towards Qatar (see chart No. 3).

- At approximately 1034 hours local time, a United Arab Emirates C-17 military transport aircraft (flight UAF1226) heading from Abu Dhabi to Sheikh Isa Airbase was 8 miles north of point NAGOG and 45 nautical miles from the coast of Qatar when the captain received a message from Qatar air defence ordering him to move away from Qatari territorial waters. After contacting Qatar civilian air traffic control, it was determined that the distance was sufficient and the aircraft continued on its course (see chart No. 4).

3. At precisely 1038 hours local time on Wednesday, 3 January 2018, a United Arab Emirates DH-6 military transport aircraft (call sign UAE2276) was observed heading to Sheikh Isa Airbase in Bahrain. The aircraft was flying in Bahrain flight information region airspace and above international waters at an altitude of 8,000 feet and was in direct contact with the Bahrain flight information centre. In accordance with air traffic control procedures, radar guidance was used to direct the aircraft to fly between airways UM600 and UL768, and then land at Sheikh Isa Airbase. The flight plan of the above-mentioned aircraft was sent in advance to the civil aviation control unit of Qatar via the automated flight plan management system, in accordance with the relevant operational procedures (see chart No. 6).


Route flown by UAF1211
27 DEC 2017
DOHA/HAMAD INTL
LAGHO
OMTO

CHART NO. 1



CHART NO.2


Routes flown by IAF813
27 DEC 2017
DOHA
GANTO
LAGMO
DOHA
BAHRAIN FIR

CHART NO. 3



CHART NO.4


Route flown by Code 0403
21 DEC 2017
BAHRAIN FIR/UIR
BAHRAIN FIR/UIR
EMPRATEE FIR
DOHA/MOHAMMED INTL
DOH
GRITO
LADMO

CHART No.5



CHART NO.6

خطط إسقاط

(1)

FIX0095 270018
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-C130/M-SDFHILORUVY/ACS
-OMAA0500
-N0300F220 DCT BOSEV N563 IMGUX P699 ORMID/N0300F220 P699 SOGAT DCT
OBSAS DCT RIGAG DCT JALYD DCT
-OBBS0116 OEDF OBBI
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AIRFORCE)

FIX1030 270338
FF OBBSZTZX OBBICONS
270338 KDENXLDB
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-10/SDFHILORUVY/ACS
-15/N0300F220 DCT BOSEV N563 IMGUX P699 ORMID/N0300F220 P699 SOGAT
DCT OBSAS DCT RIGAG DCT JALYD DCT
-18/PBN/B4B5S2T1 DOF/171227 REG/1211 EET/OBBB0034 SEL/AEHJ OPR/UAE
AIRFORCE RMK/MDCN OB JOC 330 2017)

FIX1047 270343
FF OBBSZTZX OBBICONS
270343 OMAAZPZX
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AIRFORCE RMK/MDCN OB JOC 330 2017)

FIX1501 270505
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270505 OMAAZPZX
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(2)

FIX7135 262308
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ORMID/N0205F180 P699 SOGAT DCT OBSAS DCT RIGAG DCT JALYD DCT
-OBBS0138 OEDF OBBI

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E/0959 P/TBN R/UVE S/M J/LFU D/2 24 C ORANGE
A/GREY
C/)

FIX7193 262318
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262318 OMAAZPZX
(FPL-UAF812-IM
-CN35/M-SDFGHILORTUV/C
-OMAA0500
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ORMID/N0205F180 P699 SOGAT DCT OBSAS DCT RIGAG DCT AALYD DCT
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FIX1604 270525
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270525 OMAAZPZX
(DEP-UAF812/A1753-OMAA0521-OBBS-DOF/171227)

(3)
FIX7217 262325
FF OBBICONS
262325 KDENXLDB
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-N0199F140 DCT BOSEV N563 ALPOB/N0199F140 UL768 ULADA/N0197F140
UL768 VATIM UL550 RASMO/N0197F160 UL550 NIMAR G662 GRY/N0191F150
UN318 GENEX/N0189F140 N318 ELOXI DCT
-OJAM0608 OJAI
-PBN/B4B5 DOF/171227 REG/B13 EET/OBBB0042 OEJD0138 OJACD551 OPR/UAE
AIRFORCE RMK/MDCN OB JOC 01 2017 OE 1709000011 OJ 22 1 7419
E/1115 P/TBN R/UVE S/M J/LFU D/2 24 C ORANGE
A/GREY
C/)

FIX7288 262340
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VATIM UL550 RASMO/N0197F160 UL550 NIMAR G662 GRY/N0191F150 UN318
GENEX/N0189F140 N318 ELOXI DCT
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FIX1723 270544
FF OBBICONS
270544 OMAAZPZX
(DEP-UAFB13/A1754-OMAA0542-OJAM-DOF/171227)

(4)

FIX0142 270024
FF OBBSZTZX OBBICONS
270024 KDENXLDB
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-C17/H-SDE1FGHIJ5KM1RTUWXY/HD1
-OMAA0600
-N0488F240 DCT BOSEV N563 IMGUX P699 ORMID/N0488F240 P699 SOGAT DCT OBSAS DCT RIGAG DCT JALYD DCT
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E/1051 P/TBN R/UVE S/M J/F D/3 138 C CERISE
A/GREY
C/)

FIX0148 270025
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-HHSB0250 OEGN HHAS
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E/0856 P/TBN R/UVE S/M J/F D/3 138 C CERISE
A/GREY
C/)

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270025 OBBIZQZX
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FIX0239 270037
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OPR/UAE AIRFORCE PER/D RMK/AGCS EQUIPPED TAIL NUMBER 1226)

FIX1084 270350
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DCT OBSAS DCT RIGAG DCT JALYD DCT
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OPR/UAE AIRFORCE PER/D RMK/AGCS EQUIPPED TAIL NUMBER 1226 MDCN OB JOC
329 2017)

FIX1107 270352
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OPR/UAE AIRFORCE PER/D RMK/AGCS EQUIPPED TAIL NUMBER 1226 MDCN OB
JOC 329 2017)

FIX2281 270711
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270711 OMAAZPZX
(DEP-UAF1226/A1755-OMAA0709-OBBS-DOF/171227)

(5)

FIX1593 030532
FF OBBSZTZX OBBICONS
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Security Council

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Letter dated 19 January 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am pleased to inform the members of the Security Council that, in response to a request made by the Government of Mali on 5 April 2016, and taking into consideration article 46 of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, I have decided to establish an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations of abuses and serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including allegations of conflict-related sexual violence, committed in the territory of Mali from 1 January 2012 to the date of the establishment of the Commission.

This decision is also consistent with and in furtherance of Security Council resolution 2364 (2017), paragraph 20 (a) (iii), in which the Council decided that one of the priority tasks of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), under its mandate, would be to support the implementation of the reconciliation and justice measures of the Agreement, including with respect to the establishment and operations of an international commission of inquiry.

The International Commission of Inquiry will be composed of three members with established reputations for their probity and impartiality: Lena Sundh (Sweden), Chair; Simon Munzu (Cameroon); and Vinod Boolell (Mauritius). The work of the members of the Commission will be supported by a secretariat composed of United Nations personnel, for which temporary positions will be established by MINUSMA.

I also wish to take this opportunity to advise the Council that, within the framework of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, the signatory parties to the Agreement have determined that the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, also envisioned in the provisions of article 46, will examine alleged human rights violations that occurred between 1960 and 2013, while the International Commission of Inquiry will consider those events that occurred from 1 January 2012 to the date of its establishment.

I expect the findings of the Commission to complement and help advance ongoing efforts to fight impunity by competent Malian authorities and the International Criminal Court.

I would be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annex, consisting of the terms of reference of the International Commission of Inquiry, to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

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Annex

International Commission of Inquiry established by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of abuses and serious violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law, including allegations of conflict-related sexual violence, committed throughout the territory of Mali between 1 January 2012 and the date of the establishment of the Commission

Terms of reference

I. Mandate

1. In response to a request from the Government of Mali, in a letter dated 1 July 2014 addressed to the Secretary-General, which was subsequently reiterated before the Security Council on 5 April 2016; considering the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali emanating from the Algiers process (hereinafter, the «Mali Peace Agreement»), particularly its article 46; and in conformity with paragraph 20 (a) (iii) of Security Council resolution 2364 (2017) of 29 June 2017, pursuant to which the Council entrusted the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with the mandate to support the establishment and operations of an international commission of inquiry, in consultation with the parties to the Agreement, as a priority task in support of the implementation of Agreement; the Secretary-General has decided to establish, for a period of one year, an International Commission of Inquiry, which shall:

(a) Investigate allegations of abuses and serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including allegations of conflict-related sexual violence, committed throughout the territory of Mali between 1 January 2012 and the date of the establishment of the Commission;

(b) Establish the facts and circumstances concerning the commission of such abuses and violations, including those that may constitute international crimes, and identify those allegedly responsible for such abuses and violations;

(c) Submit a written report on its investigation and its conclusions to the Secretary-General within a year from the date of the effective commencement of its work. In the report, the Commission will also present recommendations to the Secretary-General and all competent authorities, with a view to combating impunity in relation to the abuses and violations identified.

II. Composition of the Commission

2. The Commission will be composed of three independent experts of high moral standing, with recognized expertise. They will be selected by the Secretary-General, who shall also recruit the support staff of the Commission.

3. The Secretary-General will designate one of the three members of the Commission as its Chair.

4. Gender balance will be fully taken into account in the selection of the members of the Commission, who will have the required expertise, including in regard to the following criteria:

(a) Expertise or in-depth knowledge of international human rights law and/or international humanitarian law and/or international criminal law;

(b) Expertise or in-depth knowledge of principles, rules and procedures regarding fact-finding or investigation processes;

(c) Expertise or in-depth knowledge of issues relating to violence against persons, including sexual violence, violence against persons who are particularly vulnerable, including children, and other abuses and violations that may constitute international crimes;

(d) Solid knowledge about the Malian and regional contexts (in particular the historical, sociological and cultural contexts);

(e) Good working knowledge of French and, where possible, of local languages spoken in Mali.

III. Essential requirements, privileges and immunities, and facilitation of the work of the Commission and of its members

5. French shall be the working language of the Commission.

6. The Commission shall enjoy the full cooperation of the Government of Mali and of all the signatory parties to the Mali Peace Agreement in the implementation of its mandate. It shall have full and unhindered access to all persons and authorities it wishes to consult. The Commission shall also be free to address requests for cooperation to third States, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations and to their respective representatives, with a view to gathering all information, documents and declarations that it deems relevant to its work.

7. The Commission shall be granted the following facilities, freedoms and guarantees by the Government of Mali and, as applicable, by the signatory parties to the Mali Peace Agreement:

(a) Inviolability of its premises and archives, as well as of its property, funds and assets;

(b) Full and unrestricted freedom of movement throughout the territory of Mali;

(c) Free and unhindered access to all places and buildings, including sites where abuses or serious violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law are alleged to have taken place, as well as to prisons and detention centres;

(d) Full and unhindered freedom to meet with and interview all persons, including representatives of national and local authorities, members of the security forces and victims, witnesses and other persons, who committed serious violations or abuses of human rights or international humanitarian law, including persons accused or indicted. This shall include the freedom to meet with such persons in private and with due respect for confidentiality, should the Commission deem it necessary. The members of the Commission and its support personnel shall further have the right to hold meetings and interviews with persons detained or imprisoned, without the presence of the relevant penal authorities;

(e) Full and unhindered access to all sources of information, documents and materials, including official archives and documents or materials in the possession of investigative, prosecutorial and judicial authorities;

(f) All appropriate security arrangements for the members, personnel and documents of the Commission, without restricting the Commission's freedom of

movement and its ability to conduct its work, and without infringing upon its confidentiality requirements and its independence;

(g) All guarantees for the security and safety of victims and witnesses and their families cooperating or associated with the Commission and its work, by the competent authorities. Any person who contacts, meets with or is interviewed by the Commission or who provides it with information shall not, on account of having done so, be subjected to harassment, threats, acts of intimidation, reprisal or criminal prosecution.

8. The Government of Mali and the signatory parties to the Mali Peace Agreement shall respect the unrestricted freedom of all persons to contact the Commission and to provide it with information, documents and materials, including representatives of national or local authorities, members of the defence and security forces, representatives of third States and representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.

9. The Government of Mali shall accord the privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for the independent conduct of its work to the Commission, the members of the Commission and the support staff of the Commission. In particular:

(a) The members of the Commission and all persons performing functions for the Commission who are not United Nations officials shall enjoy the privileges and immunities granted to experts on mission pursuant to articles VI and VII of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, to which Mali is a party;

(b) In addition to the privileges and immunities stipulated in articles V and VII of the Convention, all United Nations officials serving with the Commission shall enjoy the immunities from personal arrest or detention and from search and seizure of their personal baggage, as well as the inviolability of their papers, documents and data, either in physical or in electronic form;

(c) All the documents and materials created, gathered or held by the Commission, irrespective of their nature, content or form, including any recordings, shall be deemed the property and archives of the United Nations, which, as such, are inviolable, consistent with article II, sections 3 and 4, of the Convention and paragraph 9 (a) above;

(d) If the Chair so requests, the Government will provide, without cost, suitable premises to the Commission.

IV. Protection of victims and persons who provide information to the Commission

10. The competent Malian authorities shall be responsible for the protection of those who cooperate with the Commission and their family members. The safety and security of all such persons further depend on the cooperation of all parties concerned. The Commission does not, in and of itself, have the means to guarantee the protection of such individuals and their families from threats or retaliation due to their cooperation with the Commission. The Commission will nevertheless take all necessary measures within its power to ensure their protection, including by seeking support from MINUSMA. To that end, the Commission shall adopt procedures and methods of work aimed at protecting such persons during all stages of its work and thereafter, including confidentiality requirements.

11. Upon commencing its work, the Commission will consult the competent authorities and the parties concerned so as to activate an early warning and support

system for victims and persons who cooperate with the Commission and their family members in case of danger or threat proffered against them. The Commission may also request the support of MINUSMA to this effect.

V. Confidentiality

12. All members of the Commission and all of its support staff shall exercise the utmost discretion during all stages of its work and thereafter. They shall refrain from taking a public stand, or otherwise making public statements, including in a personal capacity or on social media platforms, regarding their work and the activities of the Commission. The Chair of the Commission may decide to make available to the public non-confidential information on the work of the Commission, to the extent necessary and appropriate.

VI. Relationship with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

13. Considering the key task of MINUSMA to support the establishment and the functioning of the Commission, consistent with its mandate under Security Council resolution 2364 (2017):

(a) The Commission shall consult with MINUSMA with a view to obtaining the assistance required for the accomplishment of its mandate, including assistance regarding logistical, administrative and security matters;

(b) MINUSMA may rely on the provisions of its status-of-forces agreement, signed on 1 July 2013, in respect of all the activities that it will undertake in support of the Commission, without any prejudice to the full and unhindered independence of the Commission.

VII. Consultations with the parties to the Mali Peace Agreement

14. The Commission shall be free to consult the Government of Mali and all signatory parties to the Mali Peace Agreement in the context of the finalization of its report to the Secretary-General, with due respect for confidentiality and all measures that it deems necessary for the protection of victims, all other persons who provided information to it, and their respective families.

15. The Secretary-General shall decide whether the final report of the Commission should be shared with the Security Council, the Government of Mali and other signatory parties to the Peace Agreement, in whole or in part. The Secretary-General shall further decide on any questions regarding access to the archives of the Commission as well as on any conditions that he deems necessary for such access, consistent with the Secretary-General's bulletin on information sensitivity, classification and handling (ST/SGB/2007/6 of 12 February 2007).

VIII. Date of establishment

16. The Commission shall be deemed to have been established on the day that its three independent expert members are designated.